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Notes
GOVERNMENT REGULATION AND MONOPOLY
POWER IN THE ELECTRIC UTILITY
INDUSTRY
Both government regulation and the antitrust laws apply to the electric utility
industry despite their seemingly incompatible goals. Regulation, based on the tradi-
tional assumption that the industry is inherently noncompetitive, imposes arfotcial
controls to prevent the exercise of monopolypower. Antitrust, in contrast, manfests
an equally deep-rooted national commitment to free market competition. This Note
analyzes and reconciles government regulation and antitrust in the electric utility
industry in the context of monopoly power. Although the Note largely discredits the
effectiveness of regulation and its underlying assumption, it proposes that regulation
continue in phases of the industry truly incapable of sustaining competition. The
author also maintains that the antitrust laws must continue to apply to electric utili-
ties to compensatefor the deficiencies of regulation.
INTRODUCTION
THE UNDIMINISHED VITALITY of the Sherman Act' re-flects the national commitment to a competitive, free market
economic system.2 In the Sherman Act's aftermath, however,
came the recognition that certain industries defy market control,
requiring instead some degree of government regulation. The
electric utility industry exemplifies this phenomenon. To compen-
sate for the absence of control exerted by the "invisible hand"4 of
competition, federal 5 and state6 government intervened to protect
the consumer from monopoly prices and minimal services. Elec-
tric utility regulation takes essentially the same form today as
1. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976).
2. See, e.g., Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263. 272 (2d Cir.
1979) (Sherman Act "engraved in law a firm national policy that the norm for commercial
activity must be robust competition").
3. See infra notes 47-99 and accompanying text.
4. A. SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NA-
TIONS 345 (Oxford 1976 1st ed. London 1776).
[An individual] neither intends to promote the public interest, nor knows how
much he is promoting it... and by directing [his] industry in such a manner as
its produce may be of the greatest value, he intends only his own gain, and he is in
this, as in many other cases, led by an invisible hand to promote an end which was
not part of his intention.
Id. (emphasis added).
5. See infra notes 50-86 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 87-99 and accompanying text.
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originally enacted. The rational picture of regulation and anti-
trust existing side by side, however, does not portray reality. The
Supreme Court has applied both antitrust and regulation to the
electric utility industry,7 notwithstanding the apparently contra-
dictory goals of each-competition on the one hand and control
to compensate for lack of competition on the other. The need,
then, is rational reconciliation.
This Note examines the relationship between antitrust and
government regulation in the electric utility industry through the
narrow window of monopoly power. The impetus for the Note is
derived from City of Cleveland v. Cleveland Electric Illuminating
Co. I (CEI), where a jury found that the Cleveland Electric Illumi-
nating Company had neither monopolized nor attempted to mo-
nopolize the retail electricity market in Cleveland, Ohio.' The
facts and history of the case illustrate the difficulty of fitting the
monopoly power concept within the confines of the electric utility
industry.
Part I of this Note briefly examines the structure of the electric
utility industry, 10 since appreciating the problem of applying anti-
trust to the industry requires some understanding of how electric-
ity is produced. Part I then discusses the traditionally espoused
reasons for regulating the electric utility industry, and surveys the
federal and state regulatory schemes.'
Part II describes the present coexistence of antitrust and regu-
lation in the industry. Using CEI as an example, the Note sketch-
es a typical scenario in which a utility is charged with
monopolizing a local retail electric power market. 2 Aside from
examining the mechanics of bringing a monopolization claim
against an electric utility,' 3 Part II exposes misconceptions com-
monly attached to electric utility regulation. Stated simply, the
misconceptions center on two issues-whether an electric utility is
a natural monopoly, 14 and whether present regulatory schemes
7. Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973).
8. No. C75-560 (N.D. Ohio verdict Oct. 8, 1981), appeal docketed, No. 82-3053 (6th
Cir. Dec. 2, 1981).
9. Brief for Appellant at 7-8, City of Cleveland v. Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co.,
No. C75-560 (N.D. Ohio verdict Oct. 8, 1981), appeal docketed, No. 82-3053 (6th Cir. Dec.
2, 1981) [hereinafter cited as Brief for Appellant].
10. See infra notes 22-46 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 47-99 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 117-205 and accompanying text.
13. Id.
14. See infra notes 149-85 and accompanying text.
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prevent monopoly prices and output levels. 5
Part III reconciles government regulation with antitrust in the
electric power industry. Specifically, it addresses two questions:
(1) whether regulation should become more pervasive, replacing
the interstitial application of the antitrust laws, or whether regula-
tion should be repealed to allow the free reign of antitrust enforce-
ment; 16 and (2) whether antitrust and its monopoly power concept
should employ essentially neutral economic criteria instead of
more subjective criteria in the electric power industry of the
future. 17
This Note concludes that only certain aspects of the electric
power industry tend toward natural monopoly 8 and that govern-
ment regulation at all levels is minimally successful in preventing
monopolistic pricing." Application of the antitrust laws is there-
fore essential to protect consumers from the evils of monopoly
power.20 Furthermore, government regulation of aspects of the
industry exhibiting natural monopoly characteristics is essential
to promote competition as well as efficiency throughout the
industry.2'
I. THE ELECTRIC UTILITY INDUSTRY
The basic operations and structure of the electric utility indus-
try consist of three distinct phases-generation, transmission, and
distribution. This tripartite structure is largely responsible for the
industry's pervasive regulation and thus requires careful examina-
tion. This section also describes the federal and state regulatory
schemes in some detail.
A. How Electric Power Is Made
Unlike most businesses, "the electric power system must
equate supply with demand on an instantaneous basis."22 More-
over, it must accommodate wide demand fluctuations which occur
without notice during the day, week, month, or year. 3 Failure to
15. See infra notes 186-215 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 216-24 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 225-31 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 149-85 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 186-215 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 237-43 and accompanying text.
21. See infra note 244 and accompanying text.
22. Meeks, Concentration in the Electric Power Industry,- The Impact ofAntitrust Pol-
icy, 72 COLUM. L. REV. 64, 69 (1972).
23. Id.
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respond to such demand shifts will cause a power outage within
minutes because transmission and distribution facilities contain
no storage capacity.24 Thus, generating facilities must always be
prepared to increase output. This high level of preparedness dic-
tates that the system's three components be synchronized and op-
erated as a unit.25 The following discussion is separated by
component merely to facilitate understanding of the unit itself.
1. Generation
An electric power system must provide for several types of
power needs: base load (the level below which demand never
falls), peak load (varying amounts of power needed for demand in
excess of base load), and reserve requirements for all contingen-
cies.26 Electric power is generated chiefly by hydroelectric and
thermal plants.27 Although a hydroelectric system has high start-
up costs-building a dam to create a reservoir requires large capi-
tal outlays-it has low operating costs, since it needs no fuel.28
Reservoir water flows through a turbine, causing it to turn and
convert energy into electricity. 29
The four primary types of thermal systems are coal, natural
gas, oil, and nuclear. 30 In each, fuel is burned to create steam
which is released through a turbine to produce electricity.3" The
fossil fuels vary in expense and efficiency, and the plants they fire
must operate at or near capacity to enjoy economies of scale.32
Because of this lack of output flexibility, fossil fuel plants usually
24. Id. at 70.
25. Id. A system is synchronized when all generators turn at the same speed and
produce exactly the amount of power the system is using. A nonsynchronized situation
occurs when the high and low wave points of an alternating current produced by one gen-
erator do not match those produced by another generator. For this reason, a firm supplied
with electricity over a nonsynchronous interconnection cannot send both the power it gen-
erates and the supplied power over the same distribution system at the same time. Kellman
& Marino, City of Cleveland v. CEI: .4 Case Study in Attempts to Monopolize by Regulated
Utilities, 30 CLEV. ST. L. Rav. 5, 11-12 n.38 (1981) (citing 0. ELGERD, BAsIc ELECTRIC
PowER ENGINEERING 245-94 (1977)).
26. Meeks, supra note 22, at 70-71.
27. Id. at71.
28. Id.
29. Id. Hydroelectric plants are well-suited to supply peak demand since the amount
of power generated can be increased merely by allowing more water to flow through the
turbine. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 72.
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are used to supply base loads.33
Nuclear systems, though more flexible than fossil fuel plants,
have higher capital costs and thus are competitive only in large
units.34 Their major advantages over fossil fuel plants are poten-
tial fuel cost savings and the lack of air pollution. Two major
disadvantages are the danger of accidental radiation release and
problems with waste disposal.35
2. Transmission
Transmission links generation with ultimate delivery to the
consumer. Originally, transmission lines were short and had rela-
tively low voltage capacity.36 Manifold increases in capacity and
distance have created greater operating economies; while trans-
mission over low voltage lines is expensive due to power loss, as
voltage increases power loss decreases. 37 Further economies are
achieved by increasing voltage because capital and operation costs
increase in direct proportion to voltage, while capacity increases
as the square of voltage.38
3. Distribution
The final link in the production chain carries electricity to the
consumer. Although distribution has very high fixed costs in lines
and equipment, the incremental cost of carrying an additional
unit over the line is negligible. 39 Thus, economies are based on
load demand per mile of line.40 In other words, the more consum-
ers per given area, the greater the economies.
B. The Industry Structure
Electric utilities are either investor-owned, government-
owned, or cooperatively owned.4 1 Generation, transmission, and
distribution typically are integrated vertically-one firm controls
the entire production sequence-regardless of the type of
33. Id.
34. Id. at 73.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 74.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 67. Investor-owned systems serve the greatest number of customers, pub-
licly owned utilities (mostly small municipal systems) are next in size, and rural coopera-
tives have the fewest customers. Id. at 67-68.
[Vol. 33:240
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ownership.42
The majority of generation facilities are investor-owned.
Many smaller private firms and most government and cooperative
systems, which once generated power locally, now buy wholesale
power from these large nonintegrated firms, thus taking advantage
of economies of scale.43 Similarly, transmission facilities usually
are owned by large private concerns. Indeed, one commentator
notes that "[g]iven the increasing reliance upon wholesale
purchases by many of the smaller systems of all three varieties,
control over transmission becomes a most important factor in ana-
lyzing the wholesale market."44 Geographic isolation is the norm
with respect to distribution facilities since more than one system
rarely serves the same area.45 The overall picture, therefore, is
one of "a relatively large, vertically integrated system [serving] an
extensive geographic area, with several smaller private, coopera-
tive and municipal systems existing as islands within the larger
system's sphere of operation and frequently purchasing their
power at wholesale from the larger system." 46
C. Regulation
The electric utility industry, due to its size, composition, and
importance, is subject to federal and state regulation. The federal
scheme controls interstate wholesale prices and grants express au-
thority to set rates. In general, state regulation similarly controls
retail prices, although its scope varies among the states.
1. The Needfor Regulation
Legislatures have determined that the electric power industry
requires regulation, recognizing that the industry is capital-inten-
sive and possesses extensive economies of scale.47 In economic
terms, the industry is most often labeled a natural monopoly,48
42. Id.
43. Id. at 68.
44. Id.
45. Id. The existence of direct retail competition between Cleveland's municipal sys-
tem and CEI is unusual. See infra note 127 and accompanying text.
46. Meeks, supra note 22, at 68-69.
47. "Local utility services... are marked by such pronounced capital intensity and
economies of scale that conventional competition is essentially unknown. .. . These in-
dustries are regulated precisely because it has been determined that competition either can-
not or should not prevail there." Watson & Brunner, Monopolization by Regulated
"Monopolies" The Search for Substantive Standards, 22 ANTITRUST BULL. 559, 566
(1977).
48. Commentators generally agree that the traditional rationale for regulation was the
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defined as
monopoly resulting from economies of scale, a relationship be-
tween the size of the market and the size of the most efficient
firm such that one firm of efficient size can produce all or more
than the market can take at a remunerative price, and can con-
tinually expand its capacity at less cost than that of a new firm
entering the business.49
The assumption that electric utilities are natural monopolies is a
subject of debate and is explored in Part II of this Note. Notwith-
standing the questionable validity of this assumption, it is a histor-
ical reality that has fostered widespread government regulation.
2. The Federal Regulatory Scheme
The following discussion outlines the federal regulatory struc-
ture as originally enacted in 1935 and as it exists today. Signifi-
cant amendments in 1978 merit special attention because they
greatly broadened the scope of federal power to regulate electric
utilities.
a. The Federal Power Act. Congress first exercised power
over the electric utility industry in 193510 by passing the Federal
Power Act.5" As the Supreme Court stated in Gulf States Utilities
belief that the industry was a natural monopoly. See, e.g., Meeks, supra note 22, at 65
("Regulatory practices almost uniformly reflected the traditional view that the industry was
a natural monopoly, ill-adapted to the application of antitrust principles."); Primeaux, A
Reexamination of the Monopoly Market Structure for Electric Utilities, in PROMOTING
COMPETITION IN REGULATED MARKETS 175, 175 (A. Phillips ed. 1975) ("Monopoly in the
local electric utility industry is so taken for granted that it is almost forgotten that competi-
tion ever existed."); see also Fairman & Scott, Transmission, Power Pools, and Competition
in the Electric Utility Industry, 28 HASTINGS L.J. 1159, 1161-62 n.15 (1977) (regulation
substitutes for competition when an industry is a natural monopoly).
49. C. KAYSEN & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST POLICY: AN ECONOMIC AND LEGAL
ANALYSIS 191 (1959). Areeda and Turner offer a less pretentious and perhaps more illumi-
nating definition:
There may not be room enough in the market for more than one firm. A very
small town, for example, may not be able to support more than one movie house.
There may be no price of admission that will generate enough revenue to pay the
minimum operating expenses of two movie houses. In that case, demand is 'too
thin' to support two surviving firms. Monopoly is inevitable. But natural monop-
oly is not confined to markets that are small in some absolute sense.
3 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW 621(a), at 47 (1978).
50. S. REP. No. 621 pt. 1, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 17 (1935).
51. The Federal Power Act was the name given to Title II of the Public Utility Act of
1935, ch. 687, 49 Stat. 803, 838-63 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 791a-828c (1976 &
Supp. V 1981)). Title I of the Act dealt with public utility holding companies, which had
amassed great concentrations of economic and political power, S. REP. No. 621 pt. 1, supra
note 50, at 11-12, and had not been restrained by the antitrust laws. Watson & Brunner,
supra note 47, at 559.
246 [Vol. 33:240
1983] GOVERIMENT REGULTION A4ND MONOPOLY POWER 24/
Co. v. FPC,52 "[t]he [Public Utility] Act had two primary and re-
lated purposes: to curb abusive practices of public utility compa-
nies by bringing them under effective control, and to provide
effective federal regulation of the expanding business of transmit-
ting and selling electric power in interstate commerce."5
3
Federal regulation became necessary because the electric util-
ity industry had transcended state boundaries,54 and the Supreme
Court, in Public Utilities Commission v. Attleboro Steam & Electric
Co., had ruled that interstate wholesale transactions were be-
yond the states' reach. Section 201(a) of the Act set forth: "It is
declared that the business of transmitting and selling electric en-
ergy for ultimate distribution to the public is affected with a public
interest, and that Federal regulation. . . is necessary in the public
interest ... ."56
In section 201(b), the Act was made applicable to interstate
transmission and sale of electric energy at wholesale, giving the
Federal Power Commission (FPC)5 7 jurisdiction over all transmis-
sion and sale facilities.58 Whereas the FPC lacked jurisdiction to
prescribe rates for retail sales,59 it could order a public utility to
interconnect with another utility upon finding such action "neces-
sary or appropriate in the public interest."60 Interconnection
could not be ordered if it would require a firm to enlarge its gener-
52. 411 U.S. 747 (1973).
53. Id. at 758.
54. See S. REP. No. 621 pt. 1, supra note 50, at 17.
55. 273 U.S. 83 (1927).
56. Federal Power Act § 201(a), 16 U.S.C. § 824(a) (1976).
57. The Federal Power Commission (FPC) was created as part of the Federal Water
Power Act, ch. 285, § 1, 41 Stat. 1063, 1063 (1920) (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 792 (1976)). The
functions of the Federal Power Commission were transferred to the Federal Energy Regu-
latory Commission (FERC) in 1977 as part of the Department of Energy Organization Act,
Pub. L. No. 95-91, 91 Stat. 565 (1977) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7101-7375
(Supp. V 1981)). FERC was established by § 401 of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7171 (Supp. V
1981), and the transfer of functions was authorized by § 402, 42 U.S.C. § 7172 (Supp. V
1981). FERC's powers are identical to those exercised by the FPC, except for the 1978
amendments discussed infra at notes 75-86 and accompanying text.
58. Federal Power Act § 201(b), 16 U.S.C. § 824(b) (1976). The Act was not to apply
to any public projects-federal, state, or municipal. Id. § 201(f), 16 U.S.C. § 824(f) (1976).
59. FPC v. Conway Corp., 426 U.S. 271, 276 (1976).
60. Federal Power Act § 202(b), 16 U.S.C. § 824a(b) (1976). "Interconnection" is the
physical attachment of one firm's power lines to another's and is necessary when different
firms operate different stages in the production and delivery of electric power. For example,
firm A might be a retail electric power distributor with no generating capacity, and thus
must purchase electricity at wholesale from either a generation or transmission facility. If
firm B agrees to sell power to A, A can use this power only if its distribution lines are
physically connected to B's transmission lines.
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ating capacity or impair its ability to render adequate service.6'
Thus, Congress' goal was that the Commission would encourage
voluntary interconnection and coordination of facilities.62
As originally conceived, the Act was to impose upon public
utilities within the FPC's jurisdiction the duty of a common car-
rier with respect to interconnections.63 The Senate Committee on
Interstate Commerce dropped the common carrier provision,
however, in favor of one providing for voluntary coordination of
facilities,' observing: "While imposition of these duties may ulti-
mately be found to be desirable, the committee does not think that
they should be included in this first exercise of Federal power over
electric companies."65 A provision enabling the FPC to require
one utility to "wheel" power to another met the same fate.66
Again, Congress deemed voluntary action the most desirable
course.
The Federal Power Act required that all utility rates and
charges be "just and reasonable. ' 67 Upon finding any rate unjust
or unreasonable, the FPC could determine a proper rate and sub-
stitute it for the existing one. 8 Moreover, Congress gave the FPC
authority to determine and impose service standards if it found
service to be inadequate, 69 but denied it the power to compel the
61. Id.
62. Id. § 202(a), 16 U.S.C. § 824a(a) (1976).
63. S. REP. No. 621 pt. 1,supra note 50, at 19. The bill that became the Federal Power
Act was originally S. 1725, but was so amended that S. 2796 was substituted for it, becom-
ing the basis of the report. Id. pt. 2 at 1. "Section 202(a) of S. 1725 imposed upon each
public utility the duty to furnish energy to, exchange energy with and transmit energy for
any person upon reasonable request." Id. pt. 1 at 19.
64. Id. pt. I at 19.
65. Id.
66. Id.
Wheeling refers to transmission by one firm of energy generated by another firm
and delivered to a third party---that is, the generating company inputs energy into
the transmission system of the intermediate utility, which delivers the same
amount of energy to the third firm. The generating company is paid by the cus-
tomer for the power, and the intermediate firm receives a wheeling charge for the
use of its transmission lines.
Weiss, Antitrust in the Electric Power Industry, in PROMOTING COMPETITION IN REGU-
LATED MARKETS 135, 138 n.4 (A. Phillips ed. 1975).
67. Federal Power Act § 205(a), 16 U.S.C. § 824d(a) (1976). The section further re-
quires that utilities file a rate schedule with the FPC, that no rate changes take effect until
after 30 days' notice to the Commission (subsequently increased to 60 days by the Public
Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-617, § 207(a), 92 Stat. 3117, 3142
(codified at 16 U.S.C. § 824d(d) (Supp. V 1981)), and that the utility has the burden of
proving the proposed changes were reasonable.
68. Federal Power Act § 206(a), 16 U.S.C. § 824e(a) (1976).
69. Id. § 207, 16 U.S.C. § 824f (1976).
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enlargement of generating facilities or the sale of energy if either
action impaired the adequacy of existing service.70
Ratemaking is not an exact science. In FPC v. Conway
Corp., 7 1 the Supreme Court stated that "there is no single cost-
recovering rate, but a zone of reasonableness: 'Statutory reasona-
bleness is an abstract quality represented by an area rather than a
pinpoint. It allows a substantial spread between what is unreason-
able because too low and what is unreasonable because too
high."' 72 The "zone of reasonableness" concept led to the devel-
opment of a ratemaking aid called "yardstick competition,"73 de-
fined as the effect of one utility on the ratemaking determinations
of a neighboring utility. The presence of yardstick competition
requires that the regulatory commission compare relative costs. It
thus acts as a downward or moderating influence on rates.74
b. The 1978 Amendments. The powers of the FPC (now the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC)),75 expanded
considerably with the passage of the Public Utility Regulatory
Policies Act of 1978.76 Title I of the Act establishes a national
policy governing retail electric ratemaking, an area formerly left
exclusively to state control.7 7 State regulatory authorities and non-
regulated electric utilities must consider (but not necessarily
adopt) specific federal ratemaking standards. 78 The primary re-
70. Id.
71. 426 U.S. 271 (1976).
72. Id. at 278 (quoting Montana-Dakota Util. Co. v. Northwestern Pub. Serv. Co., 341
U.S. 246, 251 (1951)).
73. Fairman & Scott, supra note 48, at 1162.
74. Kellman & Marino, supra note 25, at 32-33.
75. See supra note 57.
76. Pub. L. No. 95-617, 92 Stat. 3117 (codified in scattered sections of 15, 16, 26, 30,
42, 43 U.S.C. (Supp. V 1981)).
77. Id. tit. I, §§ 101-43, 16 U.S.C. §§ 2621-44 and 42 U.S.C. §§ 6801-08 (Supp. V
1981).
78. Id. § 111(a), 16 U.S.C. § 2621(a) (Supp. V 1981). Title I states three purposes:
"[To] encourage--(1) conservation of energy supplied by electric utilities; (2) the optimiza-
tion of the efficiency of use of facilities and resources by electric utilities; and (3) equitable
rates to electric consumers." Id. § 101, 16 U.S.C. § 2611 (Supp. V 1981). The amendments
set out six standards to be considered by state commissions and nonregulated utilities in
setting their rate policies. Id. § 11 (d), 16 U.S.C. § 2621(d) (Supp. V 1981). The standards,
however, are not mandatory: "Nothing in this subsection prohibits any State regulatory
authority or nonregulated electric utility from making any determination that it is not ap-
propriate to implement any such standard, pursuant to its authority under otherwise appli-
cable State law." Id. § I11(a), 16 U.S.C. § 2621(a) (Supp. V 1981). Moreover, "[n]othing
in this title prohibits any State regulatory authority or nonregulated electric utility from
adopting, pursuant to State law, any standard or rule affecting electric utilities which is
249
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sponsibility to set retail rates remains with state regulatory
authorities.79
The most important additions to FERC's powers involve its
increased authority to require interconnections ° and wheeling,8 '
and to exempt electric utilities from state law to allow formation
of power pools. 8 2 The 1978 amendments extend interconnection
authority to cogenerators and small power producers, 3 and grant
wheeling authority when FERC finds that wheeling is in the pub-
lic interest, conserves energy, promotes efficiency, or improves re-
liability.8 4 However, FERC cannot order interconnection or
wheeling unless it determines: (1) that no uncompensated eco-
nomic loss is likely to result for any utility; (2) that no undue bur-
den would be placed on any utility; (3) that the reliability of any
utility will not be unreasonably impaired; (4) that the ability of
any utility to render adequate service to its customers will not be
impaired; and (5) that the applicant for an interconnection or
wheeling order is ready, willing, and able to reimburse the subject
firm for costs, including enlargement of transmission facilities.85
The foregoing powers are in addition to and not in lieu of FERC's
powers under the Federal Power Act.86
different from any standard established by this subtitle." Id. § 117(a), 16 U.S.C. § 2627(a)
(Supp. V 1981) (emphasis added).
79. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1750, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 67, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 7797. The principal federal concern was the structure of the rates
charged to different classes of consumers. Id. at 81, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS at 7815.
80. Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 tit. II, § 202, 16 U.S.C. § 824i
(Supp. V 1981).
81. Id. § 203, 16 U.S.C. § 824j (Supp. V 1981).
82. Id. § 205, 16 U.S.C. § 824a-1 (Supp. V 1981). A power pool is the coordination of
several electric systems to supply power to a given geographic area. Its purpose is two-
fold-to provide increased reliability on a day-to-day basis, and to take full advantage of
cost savings due to joint planning and economies of scale. Meeks, supra note 22, at 100-01.
83. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1750, supra note 79, at 90-91, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws at 7824-25. A "cogeneration facility" produces electric energy and
steam or other useful forms of energy for industrial, commercial, heating, or cooling pur-
poses. Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 tit. II, § 201(18)(A), 16 U.S.C.
§ 796(18)(A) (Supp. V 1981). A "small power production facility" produces electricity
solely by the use of biomass, waste, renewable resources, or some combination thereof as a
primary power source. Id. § 201(17)(A)(i), 16 U.S.C. § 796(17)(A)(i) (Supp. V 1981).
84. Id. § 203(a), 16 U.S.C. § 824j(a) (Supp. V 1981).
85. Id. § 204(a), 16 U.S.C. § 824k(a)-(b) (Supp. V 1981).
86. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1750, supra note 79, at 94, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS at 7829.
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3. State Regulation
State and local governments have regulated the electric utility
industry since its inception in 1879.87 Historically, a utility
needed two franchises to operate: a primary franchise for incor-
poration from the state, and a secondary franchise from the city
permitting the utility's use of the streets.88 Initially, municipalities
exercised exclusive control over utilities.89 In 1907, New York
and Wisconsin enacted the first state commission laws, and many
states soon followed suit.90
Local regulation traditionally has been rationalized as a re-
sponse to market imperfections caused by extensive economies of
scale-the natural monopoly argument.9' Indeed, the natural mo-
nopoly concept explains the movement from municipal to state
control beginning in 1907. The goal of early municipal regulators
was to promote competition among local utilities.92 Hence, cities
granted franchises to virtually anyone, assuming that widespread
competition would foster greater efficiency and lower rates. This
goal was unattainable, however, because the industry gravitated
toward consolidation, and the remaining competition was dupli-
cative and chaotic.93 The response to ineffective local control was
to shift regulation to the state level, where regulators would be
centralized, better educated, more principled, and unaffected by
local political interests.94
Some form of state regulation of electric utilities now exists in
all states.95  However, ratemaking authority is statutorily re-
stricted to retail sales.96 States regulate the installment of genera-
tion, transmission, and distribution facilities through the use of
87. Jarrel, The Demandfor State Regulation of the Electric Utility Industry, 21 J.L. &
ECON. 269, 270 (1978).
88. Id. The primary franchise was required of all corporations wishing to conduct
business in a state, whereas the secondary franchise was unique to utility companies. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. Prior to 1907, Massachusetts had a weak state commission which regulated
electric utilities. Id.
91. Id. at 273. See supra notes 47-49 and accompanying text.
92. Jarrel, supra note 87, at 273.
93. Id. at 274.
94. Id. at 274-75.
95. Before 1969, only Minnesota, South Dakota, and Texas did not regulate electric
utilities. 1 A. PRIEST, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATION 2 (1969). These states
subjected privately owned electric utilities to state commission jurisdiction in 1975. MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 216B.01 (West Supp. 1983); S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. § 49-34A-5 (Supp.
1982); TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1446c, § 2 (Vernon 1980).
96. FERC lacks authority to set retail electric rates, see supra notes 77-79 and accom-
panying text, and the Supreme Court prohibited the states from exercising authority over
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licensing powers.97 Many states also impose territorial restrictions
by requiring utilities to obtain a certificate of public convenience
and necessity or a franchise from local authorities to serve a given
area.98 Frequently, these restrictions have the unintended effect of
excluding all but a single firm from the territory.99
II. ANTITRUST AND REGULATION: FUNDAMENTAL
MISCONCEPTIONS
"The challenge of applying antitrust in the electric utility in-
dustry is to accommodate the national policy in favor of competi-
tion and at the same time protect the efficiency and reliability of
an industry second to none in the importance of our national
life."'" This Note responds to that challenge by examining the
argument for implied antitrust immunity for electric utilities, the
CEI litigation, the assumption that electric utilities are natural
monopolies, and the assumption that regulation effectively pre-
vents monopoly prices and output.
A. The Issue of Implied Immunity
Utilities sued under the antimonopolization provisions of the
Sherman Act"0' typically assert the threshold defense of implied
antitrust immunity due to government regulation. While the im-
munity defense has several forms, its basic tenets are: (1) since the
goals of antitrust and regulation are irreconcilable, one or the
other must prevail;0 2 and (2) since regulation of the subject indus-
try has been deemed the proper course, it must displace the anti-
trust laws.10 3
interstate wholesale rates in Public Util. Comn'n v. Attleboro Steam & Elec. Co., 273 U.S.
83 (1927).
97. Meeks, supra note 22, at 66 n.8.
98. Id. at 95.
99. Id. at 96.
100. Shenefield, Antitrust Policy Within the Electric Utility Industry, 16 ANTITRUST
BULL. 681, 723 (1971).
101. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1976).
102. The alleged irreconcilability is that the antitrust laws seek to preserve a market
structure based on vigorous competition among producers, while government regulation
acts as a substitute for competition in a market where it does not exist.
103. Writing in 1977, Watson and Brunner noted that "[t]o date, courts and administra-
tive agencies have usually resolved cases in which such allegations are made on threshold
issues of antitrust immunity or primary jurisdiction and therefore have seldom squarely
confronted the merits of this seeming anomaly." Watson & Brunner, supra note 47, at 560.
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1. Primary Jurisdiction
One form of the antitrust immunity defense invokes the doc-
trine of primary jurisdiction, which evolved to reconcile the func-
tions of administrative agencies with the functions of courts.'
°4
The doctrine holds that issues within the particular expertise of an
agency "should be dealt with in the first instance by those espe-
cially familiar with the customs and practices of the industry and
of the unique marketplace involved in [the] case." 10 5 Nevertheless,
as two leading commentators aptly note, the doctrine is not a vehi-
cle for immunity but merely allocates issues among forums. 10 6 In-
deed, the absence of antitrust immunity for the electric utility
industry was specified in the legislative history of section 4 of the
Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978: "[I]t is not in-
tended that the courts defer actions arising under the antitrust
laws pending a resolution of such matters by the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission. . . . [Instead,] the courts have jurisdic-
tion to proceed with antitrust cases without deferring to the Com-
mission for the exercise of primary jurisdiction.""1 7
2. Federal Regulatory Exemptions
The Supreme Court has been reluctant to grant implied ex-
emptions from the antitrust laws simply because a federal regula-
tory scheme exists. In Gordon v. New York Stock Exchange, 108 the
Court stated that "[r]epeal of the antitrust laws by implication is
not favored and not casually to be allowed. Only where there is a
'plain repugnancy between the antitrust and regulatory provisions'
will repeal be implied."'" The Gordon Court found a plain re-
pugnancy between section 19(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 and section 2 of the Sherman Act, and held that the require-
ments for implied antitrust immunity were met.110
104. Mississippi Power & Light Co. v. United Gas Pipeline Co., 532 F.2d 412,417 (5th
Cir. 1976).
105. Ricci v. Chicago Mercantile Exch., 409 U.S. 289, 305 (1973).
106. Watson & Brunner, supra note 47, at 562.
107. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1750, supra note 79, at 68, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws at 7802.
108. 422 U.S. 659 (1975).
109. Id. at 682 (quoting United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 350-51
(1963)).
I10. Id. at 685-86. "Implied repeal of the antitrust laws is, in fact, necessary to make
the Exchange Act work as it was intended." Id. at 691. Under section 19(b), the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) regulated the fixing of sales commissions on the national
exchanges. Application of the antitrust laws to these practices would bar them asper se
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The Court also recognized immunity in United States v. Na-
tionalAss'n of Securities Dealers"11 (NASD), noting: "[We have
implied immunity in particular and discrete instances to assure
that the federal agency entrusted with regulation in the public in-
terest could carry out that responsibility free from the disruption
of conflicting judgments that might be voiced by courts exercising
jurisdiction under the antitrust laws." i 2 The Court held that the
Sherman Act was displaced by the pervasive regulatory scheme
established by Congress. 113  Beyond these two exam-
ples--"repugnancy" in Gordon and "pervasive regulation" in
NASD-the Supreme Court has been unwilling to extend implied
antitrust immunity based on federal regulation.
The claim of implied immunity for the electric utility industry
under the Federal Power Act was squarely rejected in Otter Tail
Power Co. v. United States."I4 The Court found no evidence of a
legislative purpose to insulate the electric power industry and
noted the elimination of common carrier provisions regarding in-
terconnection and wheeling, stating: "Congress rejected a perva-
sive regulatory scheme for controlling the interstate distribution of
power in favor of voluntary commercial relationships.""' 5 The
violations of the Sherman Act and prevent the operation of the Exchange Act as envisioned
by Congress and the SEC. Id. at 685, 691.
111. 422 U.S. 694 (1975). In NASD the question was whether federal regulation
shielded an alleged conspiracy among members of the National Association to prevent
growth in the secondary mutual fund market. Id. at 730.
112. Id. at 734.
113. Id. at 735. The court stated that "[t]he SEC's supervisory authority over the
NASD is extensive." Id. at 732. The SEC could require registered associations to submit
any proposed rule changes for approval and request (and if necessary, order) changes in
association rules, all under the congressional command to protect the interests of the public
and shareholders. Id.
114. 410 U.S. 366, 372 (1973).
115. Id. at 373-74. Congress reexamined the validity of this rationale in 1978, when it
gave FERC expanded interconnection authority, new wheeling authority, and the power to
override state law to permit pooling arrangements. See supra notes 80-86 and accompany-
ing text. In essence, FERC now has all the authority granted to it in the original Senate bill
with the exception of the common carrier provision. See supra notes 63-65 and accompa-
nying text. This posed the obvious question: was the regulatory scheme now pervasive
enough to come within the NASD doctrine of implied exemption? See supra notes I 11-13
and accompanying text. The Act itself answered the question in the negative. Section 4
states: "Nothing in this Act or in any amendment made by this Act affects--() the appli-
cability of the antitrust laws to any electric utility or gas utility. ... Public Utility Regu-
latory Policies Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-617, §4, 92 Stat. 3120 (codified at 16 U.S.C.
§ 2603 (Supp. V 1981)). Indeed, to ensure a proper reading of the amendments, the House
Conference Committee stated in its report: "The conferees intend that the provisions of the
conference substitute be strictly neutral and not add or subtract from the immunities and
defenses available under such laws nor add or substract from authorities contained in such
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Court stated an additional test for regulatory immunity: "[]hen
these relationships are governed in the first instance by business
judgment and not regulatory coercion, courts must be hesitant to
conclude that Congress intended to override the fundamental na-
tional policies embodied in the antitrust laws."" 6
B. CEI: The Typical Case
City of Cleveland v. Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. 117
(CE!), provides a recent example of a typical monopolization case
involving an electric utility. Analysis of this case illuminates the
major problems in applying a standard section 2 analysis to a reg-
ulated industry.
1. Background.- Otter Tail Revisited
Since the electric utility industry is not immunized from the
antitrust laws, courts must reconcile the federal regulatory scheme
with the Sherman Act. After settling the immunity issue, the Otter
Tail Court addressed the alleged violation of section 2 of the
Sherman Act. Otter Tail was an integrated investor-owned utility
supplying retail electricity to numerous towns in its service
area.' 18 The municipalities it served had attempted at various
times to set up their own facilities when Otter Tail's franchises
expired," 9 but were met by the utility's refusal to sell or wheel
wholesale power to the proposed systems.' 2° The district court
held that Otter Tail had monopolized the retail electric market in
violation of section 2 and enjoined the company from refusing to
sell power at wholesale or to wheel power.1 21 The Supreme Court
laws." H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1750, supra note 79, at 68, reprintedin 1978 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws at 7802.
116. 410 U.S. at 374. This test was reaffirmed in Federal Maritime Comm'n v. Seatrain
Lines, Inc., 411 U.S. 726, 733 (1973).
117. No. C75-560 (N.D. Ohio verdict Oct. 8, 1981), appeal docketed, No. 82-3053 (6th
Cir. Dec. 2, 1981). For a detailed history of CEI, see generally Austin, City of Cleveland v.
Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co.: Monopolization, Regulation andNaturalMonopoly, 13
U. TOL. L. REv. 609 (1982).
118. United States v. Otter Tail Power Co., 331 F. Supp. 54, 56 (D. Minn. 1971), a7'd,
410 U.S. 366 (1973).
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 65. The district court characterized Otter Tail's transmission lines, over
which it refused either to interconnect or to wheel power, as a "bottleneck." A bottleneck
facility is a scarce resource, essential to competitive viability in a market. Watson & Brun-
ner, supra note 47, at 571. The district court stated that "it is an illegal restraint of trade for
a party to foreclose others from the use of a scarce facility." 331 F. Supp. at 61. Hence,
those who control such facilities must grant their competitors access on reasonable terms.
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affirmed.' 22
The Court's opinion in Otter Tail, however, provides little gui-
dance for applying antitrust in the regulatory setting, 23 since it
analyzed a regulated industry under conventional monopolization
principles. The Court thereby fostered the notion that antitrust
principles apply regardless of differences in circumstances. 124
2. CEI: The Factual Setting
CEI, an investor-owned utility, has been operating in the City
of Cleveland and surrounding areas since the 1890,s.125 The
Cleveland Municipal Electric Light & Power System (MUNY)
has been owned and operated by the City of Cleveland since
1906.126 The two companies compete directly in the same retail
market. 127
In 1958, MUNY embarked upon an aggressive campaign to
expand its customer base, 28 relying on a new generating facility
then under construction. 29  The facility became operational in
1967, but was plagued by breakdowns.'30 In early 1970, MUNY
commenced efforts to obtain a permanent interconnection with
CEI.1'1 CEI entered into an interconnection agreement with
MUNY in 1973 but, according to the City, avoided interconnec-
tion through various ploys.' 32 Ultimately, the FPC ordered CEI
Watson & Bruner, supra note 47, at 571. "As a statement of one form of monopoly power,
the 'bottleneck' principle appears to be no more than a specific application of the well-
settled general principle that monopoly power exists when 'a product is controlled by one
interest, without substitutes available in the market."' Id. at 572 (quoting United States v.
E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 394 (1956)).
122. 410 U.S. at 379. Otter Tail appealed directly to the Supreme Court under § 2 of
the Expediting Act, ch. 544, 32 Stat. 823 (1903) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 29(b)
(1976)). 410 U.S. at 369.
123. Watson & Brunner, supra note 47, at 565.
124. Id.
125. Austin, supra note 117, at 611.
126. Brief for Appellant, supra note 9, at 8.
127. Principal Trial Memorandum of Defendant the Cleveland Electric Illuminating
Company at 1, City of Cleveland v. Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co., No. C75-560 (N.D.
Ohio verdict Oct. 8, 1981), appeal docketed, No. 82-3053 (6th Cir. Dec. 2, 1981). Only ten
municipalities in the United States have such retail competition, of which Cleveland is the
only major city. Id. Nevertheless, CGI is a typical case because the issues raised are similar
to those found in most monopolization cases against electric utilities.
128. Id. at 62.
129. Id. at 61.
130. Id. at 61-62.
131. Austin, supra note 117, at 614.
132. Id.
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to establish a permanent interconnection, 3 3 which became opera-
tional in 1975.114
Meanwhile, MUNY pursued interconnection with other utili-
ties. In 1973, the Power Authority of the State of New York
agreed to supply MUNY with power, but CEI refused to wheel
the power from the Ohio border to MUNY even though it had the
capacity to do so.' 35
3. The Litigation
In 1975, the City of Cleveland sued CEI for monopolization
and attempt to monopolize in violation of section 2 of the Sher-
man Act, alleging damages caused by CEI's refusal to intercon-
nect or wheel power. The United States District Court for the
Northern District of Ohio addressed the legal issues raised in
every section 2 case--namely, the relevant market and the defend-
ant's share of that market.' 36
a. he Relevant Market. As in Otter Tail, the relevant prod-
uct market in CEI was easily identified as the sale of retail electric
133. Id.
134. Id. at 614 n.7.
135. Brief for Appellant, supra note 9, at 25.
136. Determining the presence of monopoly power involves three steps: defining a rel-
evant market, determining the defendant's share of that market, and deciding whether that
market share is large enough to infer that the defendant has the requisite degree of market
power to create liability. The term "relevant market" comprises two ideas: a product mar-
ket and a geographic market. United States v. Otter Tail Power Co., 331 F. Supp. 54, 58
(D. Minn. 1971), aft'd, 410 U.S. 366 (1973).
The product market consists of the product that the defendant makes and its substitutes.
United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 394 (1956). Substitutes
included in the product market are determined by the twin tests of cross-elasticity of de-
mand and reasonable interchangeability of consumer use. Id. at 395. The geographic mar-
ket is the competitors' area of effective competition. Record at 19,197, City of Cleveland v.
Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co., No. C75-560 (N.D. Ohio verdict Oct. 8, 1981), appeal
docketed, No. 82-3053 (6th Cir. Dec. 2, 1981).
Market share is that portion or percentage of total sales of the relevant product in the
relevant market attributable to the defendant. Traditionally, judges and lawyers assume a
high correlation between market share and market power. Id. at 19,207; Landes & Posner,
Market Power in Antitrust Cases, 94 HIARv. L. Rnv. 937, 952 (1981). Landes and Posner
argue that reliance solely on market share to determine market power can be misleading.
Id. at 947. Instead, they propose an inquiry into three factors: market share, elasticity of
market demand, and elasticity of market supply:
[A] given market share is neither necessary nor sufficient for a firm to be able to
raise prices above the competitive level. The lower the market elasticity of de-
mand and the lower the elasticity of supply of the competitive fringe, the smaller
is the market share that will enable a firm to raise price substantially above the
competitive level.
Id. at 952-53.
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power. The relevant geographic market, however, presented
problems. The City of Cleveland contended that the relevant geo-
graphic market was CEI's 1700-square-mile service area, 137 the
area in which there might have been actual or potential competi-
tion but for CEI's actions.38 CEI, on the other hand, claimed that
the relevant geographic market was the thirty-square-mile area in
which MUNY and CEI actually competed.1 39 The court ruled as
a matter of law that the relevant market was smaller than CEI's
1700-square-mile service area, but permitted the jury to consider a
geographic area larger than the City of Cleveland. 14o The differ-
ence between the two possible geographic markets was significant
because CEI's market share, and thus the likelihood that it
wielded monopoly power, decreased considerably as the geo-
graphic market approached the thirty-square-mile mark. 14 1 The
jury found the thirty-square-mile area to be the relevant geo-
graphic market. 142
b. Market Share. Many courts look only to market share
data to determine the presence of monopoly power. A market
share greater than seventy to eighty percent raises an inference of
such power.143 In a regulated industry, however, firms commonly
defend by asserting that regulation precludes the exercise of
power over prices, and hence even a large market share raises no
inference of monopoly power. CEI raised this defense to the
City's charges. n
137. Brief for Appellant, supra note 9, at 59.
138. Record at 19,198-99. The damage period was July 1, 1971 to July 1, 1975. Id. at
19,198.
139. Defendant's Supplemental Trial Memorandum at I, City of Cleveland v. Cleve-
land Elec. Illuminating Co., No. C75-560 (N.D. Ohio verdict Oct. 8, 1981), appeal dock-
eted, No. 82-3053 (6th Cir. Dec. 2, 1981) [hereinafter cited as Defendant's Supp. Trial
Memo]. A thirty-square-mile geographic market would be within the boundaries of the
City of Cleveland.
140. Record at 19,198.
141. "In its service area in 1973, CEI served 92 percent of the customers. ... Brief
for Appellant, supra note 9, at 59. MUNY then pointed out:
The trial court instructed the jury that in determining the relevant geographic
market, it should consider only factors relating to the City's preparedness to serve
customers in areas where it did not presently have facilities. [Record at
19,199-201.] The jury was thus steered toward finding an economically meaning-
less 'market' - a 30 square mile fraction of the City of Cleveland - where CEI
had little more than halfthe customers.
Id. at 60 (emphasis added). Thus, as the dimensions of the potential relevant market
shrank from 1700 to 30 square miles, CEI's market share fell from 92 to 50 percent.
142. Brief for Appellant, supra note 9, at 8.
143. Watson & Brunner, supra note 47, at 566.
144. Defendant's Supp. Trial Memo, supra note 139, at 10. In support of this argu-
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The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit re-
cently stated that "controlling a predominant share of the relevant
market cannot infer the traditional monopoly power associated
with an entity outside the regulated field."14 Similarly, commen-
tators have argued that in cases involving regulated electric utili-
ties a firm's market share should at most be a point of departure
for an analysis of monopoly power.
146
The defense that regulation negates the inference of market
power from market share rests upon the crucial assumption that
regulation is effective. If regulation in fact prevents monopoly
pricing and the exclusion of competition, the defense appears
valid.147  Unfortunately, the crucial underlying assumption is
rarely challenged in litigation. Indeed, the CEI court instructed
the jury to assume that regulation had been effective.148
C. The Natural Monopoly Assumption
Traditionally, legislators have assumed that electric utilities
are natural monopolies. This section of the Note examines that
assumption and demonstrates that components of the electric util-
ity industry exhibit strong competitive tendencies which are often
impeded by single-firm control of transmission facilities.
1. The Traditional View
Electric utility regulation traditionally has been justified by the
premise that utilities are pure natural monopolies 49 which, left to
their own devices, would set marginal cost equal to marginal reve-
nue, charge a monopoly price, and reduce output accordingly.
150
ment, CEI cited a recent article for the proposition that "to the extent that regulation is
effective, its effect is to sever market power from market share and thus render our analysis
inapplicable." Id. at I1 (quoting Landes & Posner, supra note 136, at 975). The body of
the article discusses market power in an unregulated context and points out that the con-
cept of market share has limited relevance in any context. See supra note 136 and accom-
panying text.
CEI also argued that its status as a natural monopoly precluded application of the Sher-
man Act to its activities. Austin, supra note 117, at 624. The natural monopoly issue was
not decided, however, because the jury found that CEI's conduct was lawful. Brief for
Appellant, supra note 9, at 7-8.
145. Almeda Mall, Inc. v. Houston Lighting and Power Co., 615 F.2d 343, 354 (5th Cir.
1980).
146. Watson & Brunner, supra note 47, at 567.
147. Id. at 569. But see infra notes 187-215 and accompanying text.
148. See infra text accompanying note 186.
149. See supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text.
150. See infra note 180.
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Although monopoly is taken for granted in the local electric utility
industry,' 5 no attempt has been made to differentiate between the
generation, transmission, and distribution phases of the industry.
Instead, all are assumed to possess the same natural monopoly
characteristics. Moreover, "[while] the idea that a single electric
utility firm operates at lower costs than it would if other firms ex-
isted permeates the public utility literature . . . such a view is
based more on opinion than on confirmed evidence."1 52 When
electric service became feasible in the late 1800's, no institutional
means existed to force budding utilities into the public service
mold. 15 3 The corporate structure, however, "was highly devel-
oped and capable of absorbing the new technology. Thus, it was a
disparity in institutional development that was a decisive factor in
the emergence of private monopoly as the dominant form of or-
ganization in public service industries."'' 54
2. Breaking Down the Monolith
Not all phases of electricity production and delivery are natu-
rally monopolistic. Rather, only the transmission phase exhibits
true natural monopoly tendencies. At the generation and distri-
bution levels, actual competition now exists along with potential
increased competition.
a. Generation. Commentators almost universally agree that
generation facilities currently engage in moderate competition
with the potential for greater competition. That potential, how-
ever, hinges on a restructuring of the electric utility industry.155
Generation of electric power is similar to other basic produc-
tion industries in which competition serves as the chief regula-
tor.1 56 In those industries, however, production and distribution
generally are not vertically integrated.1 7 The electric utility in-
dustry exhibits a pervasive tendency toward integration despite
the lack of opportunities for greater economies of scale.' At
present, "competition among generating companies is impeded by
151. Primeaux, supra note 48, at 175.
152. Id. at 176 n.4.
153. Id. at 175.
154. Id.
155. See, e.g., Fairman & Scott, supra note 48, at 1172-73; Meeks, supra note 22, at 76,
81-86; Weiss, supra note 66, at 136-44.
156. Meeks, supra note 22, at 82.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 81-82.
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the ownership of transmission and distribution systems by indi-
vidual generating firms." 59 Thus, to promote competition among
electric utilities, the common industry practice of vertical integra-
tion must be reformed. 16
0
Competition at the wholesale generation level takes two forms:
(1) intermodal competition from other fuels, particularly gas,16'
which is likely to increase due to new technology in the gas indus-
try and the high cross-elasticity of residential demand;162 and (2)
indirect competition for industrial loads.163 Industrial users usu-
ally pay low rates by locating in low-rate areas and taking advan-
tage of special rates for high-load users."6 Here again, elasticity of
demand is significant. 6
5
b. Transmission. The transmission function is a classic natu-
ral monopoly.' 66 Duplication of facilities on any scale would be
both economically and aesthetically wasteful.' 67 Yet, the perva-
sive vertical integration of the industry, and the fact that transmis-
sion capability is a prerequisite to wholesale power transactions,
have artificially chilled both wholesale and retail competition.1 6
8
In other words, due to present ownership patterns, the natural mo-
nopoly characteristics of electric power transmission have had an
unnaturally anticompetitive impact on wholesale and retail power
sales. It has been noted that "on balance, the major factor limit-
ing the development of wholesale competition, given the effect of
vertical integration, is the widespread industry attitude of unwill-
ingness to offer wholesale firm power outside existing service ar-
eas."' 169 Failure to break the pattern of private transmission
159. Weiss, supra note 66, at 138.
160. Meeks, supra note 22, at 81-82.
161. Weiss, supra note 66, at 139.
162. Id. at 139-40.
163. Id. at 145.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 144.
167. Meeks, supra note 22, at 87.
168. Id. at 86.
Under present circumstances, the system that controls transmission controls
wholesale power in the area, and it is usually the large, vertically integrated, in-
vestor-owned system that retains this control. These large systems generally
maintain their position as the only source of wholesale power to smaller systems
within the area by refusing to 'transport' power from potentially competing
sources to the region's wholesale purchasers.
Id.
169. Fairman & Scott, supra note 48, at 1172.
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facility ownership will hinder future competitive impulses in the
industry.
The transmission bottleneck can be mitigated or eliminated in
three ways. One solution is to require separate ownership and
control at each level of the industry.17 0 Divestiture is a drastic
remedy, however, with no guarantee that the desired benefits
would outweigh the costs of rebuilding the industry. 7 ' A practi-
cal alternative is to designate transmission facilities as common
carriers and thus require that they be made available to all to the
extent that excess capacity exists.172 This is not a new idea-as
originally conceived, the Federal Power Act contained a common
carrier provision for transmission facilities. 73 "When one views
the transmission function as simply that of the long-distance car-
rier in the electric power industry, equivalent to railroads or
trucks in other industries, it is not difficult to conclude that the
same rules should apply."' 74 The third and least disruptive solu-
tion is to utilize FERC's powers to order interconnections and
wheeling to assure that transmission facilities would function as
true conduits for power. The major drawback to this approach is
its burdensome procedural requirements. Only those willing to
endure administrative proceedings will obtain results, and then
only if FERC makes the requisite findings. 175
c. Distribution. Commentators disagree as to the status of
competition in the retail distribution market. According to one
view, distribution, like transmission, is considered a natural mo-
nopoly. 7 6 Competition, such as that between CEI and MUNY, is
considered impracticable because of enormous inefficiencies cre-
ated by duplicate facilities. 177 In contrast, one analyst presents
empirical data to show that the presence of competition in the re-
tail distribution market has caused utilities to operate at lower av-
erage cost levels.' 78 While this downward effect on average cost
was somewhat offset by the fact that marginal costs were higher
170. Meeks, supra note 22, at 87.
171. Id.
172. Id. Public ownership of transmission facilities offers an alternative possibility.
Weiss, supra note 66, at 145.
173. See supra notes 63-65 and accompanying text.
174. Meeks, supra note 22, at 89.
175. See supra notes 83-85 and accompanying text.
176. Meeks, supra note 22, at 100.
177. Id. at 94.
178. Primeaux, supra note 48, at 192.
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for competitive firms than for noncompetitive ones, 179 the ulti-
mate effect was that added competition steepened the total cost
curve. The study concluded that competition provided tangible
cost benefits at relatively lower levels of output.1
8 0
Most authorities agree, however, that the greatest potential
benefits result from yardstick competition.18 ' The presence of a
comparative standard acts as a check on the "necessarily less-
than-perfect regulatory control exercised by the responsible agen-
cies."' 2 The efficacy of yardstick competition depends on the sur-
vival of smaller firms, whose survival, in turn, depends on gaining
access to economies of scale enjoyed by the larger firms).83 Thus,
the transmission bottleneck becomes relevant at the distribution
level.' 84 Only by freeing transmission facilities from present own-
ership patterns will retail electric power distribution remain
competitive.185
D. The Assumption of Effective Regulation
Along with the natural monopoly assumption is the equally
ingrained assumption that government regulation effectively pre-
vents monopoly prices and output. This section of the Note exam-
179. Id.
180. Id. at 194. The author noted:
While it is perhaps correct that monopoly firms could, ceteris paribus, produce at
lower costs than competitive firms, the present data show that they sometimes fail
actually to do so .... To the extent that competition results in a net cost advan-
tage over monopoly within some output range, however, policy must be based on
actual rather than possible cost levels.
Id. at 195-97 (emphasis in original).
181. See supra notes 73-74 and accompanying text.
182. Meeks, supra note 22, at 77.
183. The present trends in the electric power industry decrease the effectiveness of
yardstick competition as a measure of efficiency. Meeks, supra note 22, at 78. The nature
of electric power generation is such that increased size brings about a concomitant increase
in economies of scale. Such economies dictate that it is in the public interest to demand
growth. Id. at 74. Yet, creation of new generating capacity produces excess capacity for
the firm installing the new system, since demand grows at fairly constant rates. Id. at 75.
In order to take full advantage of economies of scale, firms can do three things: (1) less
efficient generating firms can purchase power wholesale from the larger, more efficient
firms; (2) firms can join power pools to plan new generation facilities; or (3) firms can
merge into giant utilities for the same purpose. Id.
184. Fairman & Scott, supra note 48, at 1162-63.
185. Meeks, supra note 22, at 79. "Proliferation of ownership is essential to yardstick
competition, and there may be great merit, in order to hold each system's monopoly power
in check, in protecting systems from unfair practices and trying to give all systems access to
pools or competitive sources of wholesale power." Id. Indeed, "[t]he availability of such
services, either by voluntary action or under pressure of law or public policy, is the cutting
edge of competition's knife." Fairman & Scott, supra note 48, at 1173.
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ines this second assumption in the context of the CEI litigation,
and discusses several theoretical and practical criticisms of regula-
tory effectiveness. The picture painted by critics shows that the
assumption of regulatory effectiveness is at best questionable and
at worst patently incorrect.
1. Assumed Effectiveness
In CEI, the utility defended against the City's monopolization
charge by claiming that regulation negated the inference of mo-
nopoly power from a large market share. Such a defense neces-
sarily hinges on the validity of the assumption of regulatory
effectiveness. In the CEI litigation, however, the validity of the
assumption was not questioned. Instead, the court charged the
jury: "In considering the effect of regulation upon CEI's power to
control prices, the Court instructs you that you must assume that
the specfc authority of the [Public Utility Commission of Ohio] to
regulate rates as I have explained that aurhotity [sic] to you was
properly and effectively exercised. 186
2. Criticisms of Regulation
Criticism of the assumption of regulatory effectiveness ema-
nates from the entire political/economic spectrum, and reaches
consensus on one point: "[T]he alphabet regulatory agencies are
at best ineffectual and at worst counter-productive.""8 7 Moreover,
"[m]ost regulated industries have become federal protectorates,
living in a cozy world of cost-plus, protected from the ugly spec-
ters of competition, efficiency and innovation." 1
88
Lack of resources is a major cause of regulatory ineffective-
ness.' 89 For example, the Utah Public Service Commission, a typ-
ical state regulatory body, "has no economists, no auditors, no
hearing examiners or administrative law judges, no rate analysts,
no public utilities specialists, no environmental specialists, and no
public relations specialists."' 90 This regulatory incapacity is mag-
nified by the wealth of expertise at the disposal of private utilities.
Another phenomenon drains regulatory vigor: regulators, after
extended exposure to an industry through the regulatory process,
186. Record at 19,204-05 (emphasis added).
187. A. AUSTIN, ANTITRUST: LAW, ECONOMICS, POLICY § 12.9 (1976).
188. Id. § 4.10 (quoting Wall St. J., Oct. 9, 1974, at 1, col. 1).
189. Note, Regulation, Competition, and Your Local Power Company, 1974 UTAH L.
Rnv. 785, 795.
190. Id.
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tend to sympathize with the industry point of view, despite their
statutory obligation to represent the public interest. 191 A third
malady is "regulatory lag" 192-- the interval of months or even
years over which rate cases extend. During a period of decreasing
industry costs, the lag often means excess profits for utilities. Dur-
ing inflationary periods, however, the lag adversely affects the
industry.
93
More fundamental criticisms of regulation question its use in
theory. For example, critics charge that regulation is wasteful and
inefficient. While competition creates an incentive to reduce
costs, 194 regulation has the opposite effect. Since a firm's earnings
depend on its capital investment or "rate base," it will be eager to
invest.1 95 Improved technology reduces costs and further presses
firms to spend increasing amounts on research and development
to sustain high profits. The result is a negligible incentive to econ-
omize. In fact, regulatory lag may provide the sole incentive to
improve firm technology, and even then, only in periods of in-
creasing industry costs. 196 Critics also have charged that due to its
sheer complexity, the electric utility industry defies regulation. 97
Moreover, regulation may be crippled by the lack of a standard
for setting rates. "It is particularly difficult for regulation to en-
sure efficiency and progressiveness because the bench marks sup-
plied by competitive firms in comparable positions are typically
absent." 98
Two empirical studies of regulatory effectiveness reveal addi-
tional weaknesses in the system. The first study focused on the
impetus for state regulation' 99 and concluded that the evidence
supported a "positive theory of regulation" 20---that regulators are
191. Id. at 796.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 797.
195. Id. In Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466 (1898), the Supreme Court held that calcula-
tions to determine the resonableness of rates must be based on the "fair value method."
Most states adopted this standard for their own ratemaking procedures. In FPC v. Hope
Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591 (1949), the Court overruled Smyth, holding that no specific
formula need be used and outlining several factors as key ratemaking considerations.
Note, supra note 189, at 793-94.
196. Note, supra note 189, at 797-98.
197. Id. at 798.
198. C. KAYSEN & D. TURNER, supra note 49, at 192. Utility commissions can make
yardstick comparisons between neighboring firms, but not with any degree of precision,
since situations in other firms usually vary significantly. Id.
199. See supra notes 87-99 and accompanying text.
200. Jarrel, supra note 87, at 293.
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"captured" by the regulated and serve private industry instead of
the public interest. According to the positive theory, "regulation
is demanded when it can confer upon the politically powerful in-
terest group some benefit or advantage that the group could not
secure as cheaply on its own."' 2° ' Applied to the electric utility
industry, this suggests that "if producers were politically more ef-
fective than consumers in dealings with state regulators, competi-
tive electricity markets would generate the greatest demand for
state regulation. 20 2
To test the positive theory, the study, which covered several
states, examined data from 1912, the eve of state regulatory legis-
lation. The data was run through an economic model in which
high prices and profit margins before regulation support a procon-
sumer theory, while low prices and profits support the positive
theory.2 °3 The results indicated that preregulation prices in states
which first regulated utilities were considerably lower than in
states which regulated much later.2° After regulation was insti-
tuted in the early-regulated states, prices and profits rose to levels
approaching those in the later-regulated states.205 The study thus
supports the proposition that competitive electricity markets cre-
ated the demand for state regulation because utilities could reap
higher profits in a regulated setting, not because competition was
inherently unworkable or duplicative.
A second study analyzed the effectiveness of regulation with
regard to controlling monopoly power and eliminating price dis-
crimination. 2°  The study concluded that regulation had no sig-
nificant effect on the average level of rates.20 7 As for the structure
of rates, assuming that regulation was effective, the authors of the
study expected to find a reduction in rates for domestic consumers
of small amounts of electricity because of the potential political
popularity of low rates.20 8 The authors also compared charges to
domestic and industrial users in regulated and unregulated states,
201. Id. at 280.
202. Id. at 281.
203. Id. at 282.
204. Id. at 286-87.
205. Id. at 287. "Taken together, the evidence on price, output, and profit seems more
consistent with the hypothesis that state regulation was in greatest demand, and thus was
established earliest, in states with the more competitive markets for electricity." Id. at 289.
206. Stigler & Friedland, "hat Can Regulators Regulate? The Case of Electricity, 5 J.L.
& ECON. 1, 1 (1962).
207. Id. at 8.
208. Id.
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expecting to find lower rates for domestic users in regulated
states.2°9 In both cases, however, the data belied the expecta-
tions-regulation had no discernable effect.2z 0
The study traced regulatory ineffectiveness to two factors.
First, individual utilities did not possess long-run monopoly
power,2" but instead faced competition from alternative energy
sources and rival utility systems. 2  Second, the regulatory bodies
were "incapable of forcing the utility to operate at a specified
combination of output, price, and cost. 2 13 The study concluded
that the basis for regulation was the assumption that without gov-
ernment intervention firms would exercise exorbitant monopoly
power.2 14 Were that assumption true, regulation might have had
a tangible effect. Electric utilities, however, do not possess such
power.21 5
Given the questionable validity of the dual assumptions of
regulation, the need for both antitrust and regulation is apparent.
Since regulation has failed to prevent monopoly pricing and out-
put in the industry, antitrust should step in. Yet regulation must
be preserved to eradicate monopoly power at the transmission
stage-the only stage to exhibit true natural monopoly character-
istics. Thus, the controlling hand of regulation and the invisible
hand of free market competition must work together to ensure an
efficient, responsive electric utility industry.
III. VISIONS OF THE FUTURE: REGULATION AND
ANTITRUST RECONCILED
By Supreme Court mandate, both antitrust and pervasive state
and federal regulation apply to the electric utility industry.21 6 The
challenge is to reconcile the apparently conflicting goals of each in
some workable fashion, or to determine which goal is to prevail.
Given the industry structure,21 7 the regulatory schemes, 21 8 and the
209. Id. at 9.
210. Id. at 8-9.
211. This observation supports the stance of other commentators who have disputed
the basic assumption that the electric utility industry is a natural monopoly. See supra
notes 155-85 and accompanying text.
212. Stigler & Friedland, supra note 206, at 11.
213. Id. at 12.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Otter Tail, 410 U.S. at 372-75.
217. See supra notes 41-46 and accompanying text.
218. See supra notes 47-99 and accompanying text.
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questionable validity of the assumptions underlying regulation,21
neither goal should prevail. Instead, practical, positivist consider-
ations dictate that both policies should guide the industry. Yet,
certain normative assumptions must also enter the equation which
will shape the industry's future.
Any assertion that electric utilities are immune from antitrust
attack due to the recent broadening of the federal regulatory
scheme contravenes the express intention of Congress that the new
provisions be neutral in their effect on antitrust law.220 Moreover,
espousal of increased regulation ignores the pervasive theoretical
and practical difficulties in the regulatory process outlined above.
Heightened regulation would only create inefficiencies and thus
higher costs for the consumer.22'
Nevertheless, the inability of federal and state agencies to reg-
ulate the electric power industry at price and output levels found
only in a theoretical model of perfect competition does not man-
date massive repeal of regulatory authority. While the characteris-
tics of the industry do not support the pure natural monopoly
theory that originally fostered regulation,222 there are aspects of
the industry, particularly the transmission function, that exhibit a
need for control.223 Total deregulation would realize the worst
fears of those who recognize that the transmission function is a
true natural monopoly. Applying antitrust to the transmission
function would also miss the mark, however, by imposing a com-
petitive structure upon a phase of the industry which can effi-
ciently support only one participant.224
Normative assumptions about the future of the electric utility
industry harken back to the original goals of antitrust policy.
"[A]ntitrust is firmly anchored in Jeffersonian socio-political com-
mitments which form part of the broad philosophical statement
justifying the Sherman Act's intrusion into the marketplace. '225
One commitment was that competition was a desirable end in it-
self.226 When competition serves as a legitimate end as well as a
means to efficient resource allocation, its preservation is doubly
important.
219. See supra notes 149-215 and accompanying text.
220. See supra note 126.
221. See supra notes 187-215 and accompanying text.
222. See supra notes 47-49 and accompanying text.
223. See supra notes 155-85 and accompanying text.
224. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
225. Austin, The Emergence of SocietalAnfitrust, 47 N.Y.U. L. REV. 903, 904 (1972).
226. C. KAYSEN & D. TURNER, supra note 49, at 14-16.
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The future of the electric utility industry can be characterized
by one word-bigness. Economies of scale in power generation
are seemingly infinite, and consumer needs are certain to grow
steadily.227 The optimum efficiency outlook is one of massive
generation facilities, huge power pools, and perhaps colossal
mergers.228 The dual functions of competition, the synthesis of
conflicting antitrust goals, is apparently unworkable here. Indus-
trial giantism breeds concentration of wealth and power, and the
normative function of competition is brushed aside.
Perhaps this is the proper result in an industry of such national
importance. For some, socio-political niceties are merely bother-
some and ephemeral roadblocks in the path of ultimate efficiency.
But for others, competition for its own sake is no insignificant
goal. Smaller electric utilities are more likely to respond to con-
sumer and local interests and less likely to wield overbearing
political influence. 229 Firms of equal size allow for effective com-
parison, and thus more efficient regulation.230 Finally, the pres-
ence of numerous firms permits diversity, experimentation, and
healthier development. 231
Satisfying the conflicting desires for competition and efficiency
in the electric utility industry may be possible. The key is altering
the transmission bottleneck,232 whether by forced separate owner-
ship,233 declaration of common carrier status, 234 or vigorous use of
FERC's interconnection and wheeling authority.235 As a middle
path between disruptive industry reorganization and haphazard
assertion of regulatory authority, granting the transmission facility
common carrier status is the best approach.236 This would allow
free access to the transmission level, thus encouraging efficiency
and competition. By giving smaller firms a choice between buying
wholesale power from a variety of efficient generation sources and
forming power pools with similarly sized utilities, common carrier
status would enable utilities to provide both efficient and respon-
sive service to customers.
227. See supra note 183.
228. Id.
229. Meeks, supra note 22, at 80.
230. Id. See supra notes 181-85 and accompanying text.
231. Id.
232. See supra notes 166-75 and accompanying text.
233. See supra notes 170-71 and accompanying text.
234. See supra notes 172-74 and accompanying text.
235. See supra note 175 and accompanying text.
236. See supra text accompanying notes 170-75.
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IV. CONCLUSION
This Note shows through analysis of monopoly power that an-
titrust has an essential function in the electric utility industry. As
CEI illustrates, working with the monopoly power concept in the
regulated utility context is quite difficult.23 7 Indeed, scrutiny of the
concept in this setting challenges the soundness of the assumptions
that the industry is a natural monopoly and that regulation is ef-
fective in preventing monopoly prices and output levels.238 The
electric utility industry, while traditionally characterized as a nat-
ural monopoly by legislators, is potentially competitive at the gen-
eration and distribution levels.239 The realization of such
competition, however, depends upon clearing the transmission
bottleneck.2' In addition, the longstanding assumption of the ef-
fectiveness of regulation, exemplified by the jury instructions in
CEI,241 is suspect.242 For both practical and theoretical reasons,
regulation has had only minimal success in replacing traditional
market controls.243
As a result of the inadequacies of regulation, antitrust policy
has a vital role to play in the electric power industry--to shield
consumers from the heavy hand of monopoly power. This Note,
however, does not support massive repeal of electric utility regula-
tion. Rather, regulation designating transmission facilities as
common carriers is critical to clearing the transmission bottleneck
and promoting competition and efficiency. 2' Thus, antitrust and
government regulation, although seemingly conflicting in their
aims, can and must continue to coexist in the electric utility
industry.
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237. See supra notes 117-48 and accompanying text.
238. See supra notes 149-215 and accompanying text.
239. See supra notes 149-85 and accompanying text.
240. See supra notes 155-85 and accompanying text.
241. See supra text accompanying note 186.
242. See supra notes 187-215 and accompanying text.
243. Id.
244. See supra notes 232-36 and accompanying text.
